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Three Arguments Against Mt.
Healthy: Tort Theory,
Constitutional Torts, and Freedom
of Speech
by Michael Wells*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle1 is
among the most important, and least discussed, cases in constitutional

tort law.' It stands for the abstract principle that the "but-for" rule of
causation, which is the usual test in common-law torts, applies in
constitutional tort suits as well. To understand the principle and its
implications, it is helpful to have in mind a concrete example of its
application, and Mt. Healthy provides as good an illustration as any
other case. Doyle, a nontenured school teacher, quarreled with another
teacher, with school employees, and with students.' Two specific
incidents deserve mention. First, on one occasion he "made an obscene
gesture to two girls in connection with their failure to obey commands
made in his capacity as cafeteria supervisor."' Second, after the
principal circulated a memorandum on a teacher dress code, he called a
local radio station to criticize the administration.5 "[Cliting 'a notable
lack of tact in handling professional matters which le[ft] much doubt as
* J. Alton Hosch Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. University of
Virginia (B.A., 1972; J.D., 1975). The Author wishes to thank Tom Eaton and Richard
Nagareda for helpful comments on a draft of this Article.
1. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
2. After nearly two decades, the best treatment of the issue remains Thomas A. Eaton,
Causationin ConstitutionalTorts, 67 IOWA L. REV. 443 (1982).
3. 429 U.S. at 281.
4. Id. at 282.
5. Id.
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to [his] sincerity in establishing good school relationships,"'6 and giving
the radio station incident and the obscene gesture incident as examples,
the school
district declined to offer him a contract for the next school
7
year.
Doyle sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,8 which authorizes victims of
constitutional violations to sue for damages or injunctive relief.9
Though Doyle was able to show that protected speech played a part in
the decision, a unanimous Court held that he could not recover damages
for the discharge if the government could prove that he would have been
fired anyway, for constitutionally permissible reasons." Otherwise,
Doyle would be "in a better position as a result of the exercise of
constitutionally protected conduct than he would have occupied had he
done nothing."" The Court adopted a two-part test for causation in
mixed motive cases.1 2 First, the plaintiff must show that the "conduct
was constitutionally protected, and that this conduct was a 'substantial
factor'-or, to put it in other words, that it was a 'motivating factor' in
the Board's decision."" Once the plaintiff meets the substantial factor
test, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to show "by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision...
even in the absence of the protected conduct."' 4 The Court's rule is a
variant of the but-for test that governs most cause-in-fact issues in the
common law of torts, differing only in its allocation of the burden of
proof. 5 Unlike the issue of whether speech is protected by the First
Amendment, which is a question of law for the court, the causation issue

6. Id.
7. Id. at 282-83.
8.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).

9. Id. at 277. The statute provides that lelvery person who, under color of [state law]
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any.., person... to the deprivation of any rights...
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
10. 429 U.S. at 287.
11. Id. at 285.
12. Id. at 287.
13. Id. (footnote omitted).
14. Id.; see also Texas v. Lesage, 120 S. Ct. 467, 468 (2000); Givhan v. Western Line
Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 416 (1979).

15. Ordinarily, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that but for the defendant's
breach of duty, the harm would not have taken place. Even in the common law, special
circumstances sometimes justify shifting the burden of proof on causation to the defendant.
See, e.g., Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 478 P.2d 465, 474-75 (Cal. 1970) (maintaining that

defendant's breach of statutory duty was responsible for the lack of evidence as to what
caused plaintiffs death).

20001

THREE ARGUMENTS

585

jury, subject to the customary judicial oversight for reasonableis for 1the
6
ness.

As the other papers in this symposium attest, this mixed motives fact
pattern arises frequently in constitutional tort law because the validity
of government action may turn on the motive behind it. 17 The Mt.

Healthy causation rule has spread from First Amendment retaliation law
throughout section 1983 litigation. The topic of the symposium is
whether the Mt. Healthy rule goes to liability or only to damages. In my
view, this is not the best way to frame the issue, for it seems to take the
holding as a given and to focus attention only on the scope of the rule.
The more fundamental question is whether either damages or liability
ought to depend on meeting the Mt. Healthy test.
This Article argues that Mt. Healthy was wrongly decided and
therefore should not be applied either in determining liability or in
assessing damages. It should be replaced by a rule that allows the
plaintiff to recover full damages whenever the constitutional violation
was sufficient to cause them. Part II focuses on the role of causation in
tort law. Examining Mt. Healthy from the perspective of general tort
theory, I argue that the ruling is at odds with the fairness and
deterrence goals of tort law. Part III shifts to the special features of the
constitutional tort context. Quite apart from the general principles of
tort law, the special role of constitutional tort law as part of the system
of constitutional remedies justifies a more plaintiff-friendly causation
rule for constitutional torts. In Part IV, I return to the First Amendment origins of Mt. Healthy and argue that certain distinctive features
of retaliation cases, in particular the fragility of First Amendment rights,
justify a special sufficient cause rule in this context, even if such a rule
were rejected for other constitutional claims. Notice that, while the
narrow focus of Part IV is the First Amendment retaliation doctrine, the
rest of the analysis is relevant across the whole range of constitutional
tort suits.
These three arguments are sufficiently distinct to require separate
treatment, yet they are variations on a single theme. The Court in Mt.

16. See, e.g., Gattis v. Brice, 136 F.3d 724, 726 (11th Cir. 1998); Gardetto v. Mason, 100
F.3d 803, 811-18 (10th Cir. 1996); Shands v. City of Kennett, 993 F.2d 1337, 1343 (8th Cir.
1993). The jury's role is not limited to deciding causation, of course. "[T]he jury should
decide ... the nature and substance of the plaintiffs speech activity, and whether the
speech created disharmony in the work place. The trial court should then combine the
jury's factual findings with its legal conclusions in determining whether the plaintiffs
speech is protected." Shands, 993 F.2d at 1342-43 (citations omitted).
17. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (noting that "the invidious
quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a
racially discriminatory purpose").
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Healthy maintained that "[tihe constitutional principle at stake is
sufficiently vindicated if such an employee is placed in no worse a
position than if he had not engaged in the conduct." 8 Each of the
three arguments I advance is a ground for doubting whether the but-for
rule sufficiently vindicates the free speech rights of public employees.
Principles drawn from tort theory, constitutional remedies, and First
Amendment law all suggest that the but-for rule falls short.

II.

TORT THEORY, MULTIPLE CAUSES, AND MIXED MOTIVES

Because there are significant differences between the aims of ordinary
tort law and the section 1983 cause of action, it would be a mistake to
resolve constitutional tort issues by simply transplanting general tort
principles into the constitutional context.19 Even so, general tort law
is an appropriate place to begin the analysis of constitutional tort issues,
provided one keeps in mind that it is only the beginning. Over many
years courts and scholars have brought substantial intellectual resources
to bear on the issues that arise in suits to recover damages for past
wrongs, and many of their insights are relevant in the constitutional tort
context. The goals of tort law are to achieve fairness between the
parties and to deter socially objectionable conduct,2 ° and the justification for the causation requirement is that it is a (more or less useful)
tool for pursuing those ends. 2' Though some theorists disagree,2 2

18. 429 U.S. at 285-86. This is the main substantive argument in the opinion. The
Court also expressed concern that the decision to rehire Doyle would have given him
tenure:
The long-term consequences of an award of tenure are of great moment both to the
employee and to the employer. They are too significant for us to hold that the
Board in this case would be precluded, because it considered constitutionally
protected conduct in deciding not to rehire Doyle, from attempting to prove to a
trier of fact that quite apart from such conduct Doyle's record was such that he
would not have been rehired in any event.
Id. at 286. One answer to this argument is that it hardly justifies a blanket rule for all
constitutional torts or all retaliation cases. Also, it is clear today, if it was not so in 1977,
that the decision to create property interests in public jobs is solely up to the state. See
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-41 (1985). Governments do not
need a favorable constitutional tort causation rule to avoid unwanted grants of tenure.
19. See infra Part III.
20. For a defense of the proposition that tort law serves both of these goals, see Gary
T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective
Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801 (1997).
21. See id. at 1817 & nn.123-24 (defending causation on economic grounds while
conceding that "economic analysts often are uncomfortable with tort law's causation
requirement"); id. at 1822 (noting that "tort law's causation standard... is an essential
component of a corrective justice account of tort law").
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courts generally take it for granted that it is unfair to make even a
faulty defendant pay damages if there is no connection between the fault
and the harm. As for deterrence, the causation requirement is justified
as a means of assuring that there is a real need for legal intervention.
The absence of a causal link between the behavior and harm suggests
that the defendant's actions do not have undesirable consequences,
thereby undermining the case for liability.
The Court in Mt. Healthy applied the but-for test to the mixed motive
issue with little analysis, as though it were a fundamental and
incontestable rule of tort law. In reality, common-law courts do not view
the but-for test as an immutable principle that applies without exception
across the whole range of causation problems. It is a means toward
realizing these aims and should not be used when fairness and
deterrence are better served by other means.2" In most circumstances,
the but-for test serves these goals well by distinguishing the cases in
which defendants bear no responsibility for the harm from those in
which there is such a connection. But this is not always so. In a fact
pattern that somewhat resembles the mixed motives problem, they have
rejected the but-for test in favor of a rule that is far more favorable to
the plaintiff. Suppose two fires, each large enough to destroy the
plaintiff's house, advance inexorably toward the property. They come
together before reaching the plaintiff's property, and the larger fire
consumes the house. Even though the but-for test is not met with
regard to either fire, a defendant responsible for either of them would be
22. Compare Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing
Risks, 37 UCLA L. REV. 439 (1990) (arguing that, in certain cases, tort liability should
attach when one increases the risk of harm occurring, regardless of whether any harm
actually occurs) with Kenneth W. Simons, Corrective Justice and Liability for RiskCreation: A Comment, 38 UCLA L. REV. 113 (1990) (criticizing Professor Schroeder's
argument as "plausible but incomplete").
23. Consider a case in which the defendant's misdiagnosis or wrongful emission of toxic
substances has increased the risk of harm across a range of potential injuries. If, in a
population of one hundred, the risk of injury is 10% in the absence of the defendant's error,
but 15% with it, the chance that any given harm is due to the defendant is only one in
three. Though the defendant is responsible for one-third of the harms that result, the butfor test would absolve the defendant every time. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 117 (1987). A better approach would be to "impose liability
and distribute compensation in proportion to the probability of causation assigned to the

excess disease risk in the exposed population, regardless whether that probability fell
above or below the fifty-percent threshold and despite the absence of individualized proof
of the causal connection." David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure
Cases: A "PublicLaw" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. REV. 849, 859 (1984); cf.
Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924, 936-38 (Cal. 1980) (favoring market share liability
over the but-for test in circumstances where it is virtually impossible to tell which
defendant is responsible for any particular harm).
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liable under the substantial factor-or, more precisely, a sufficient
cause-test of causation.24
The mixed motives issue decided in Mt. Healthy resembles the
causation problem presented by the two-fires case. As a matter of fact,
each of the motives may be sufficient to produce the dismissal. Indeed,
this may be the typical case, yet under the Court's rule the defendant
escapes liability so long as the jury finds that the permissible motive
would have been sufficient.2 5 The Court never quite faced up to this
implication of its rule. It characterized the holding as a rejection of "[a]
rule of causation which focuses solely on whether protected conduct
played a part, 'substantial' or otherwise, in a decision not to rehire."26
But this formulation fails to address squarely the case in which the
impermissible motive does not merely play a part, but is sufficient to
bring about the dismissal. It may well be that the plaintiff should lose
if the permissible motive is sufficient to bring about the employer's
action and the impermissible motive has a subsidiary role, merely
"mak[ing] the employer more certain of the correctness of its decision. " " By contrast, in a given case the jury may find as a matter of
fact that each motive, the bad one as well as the good one, was sufficient
by itself to produce the firing. Lower courts read Mt. Healthy as
requiring them to find for the defendant in these circumstances. 2s
There are good reasons, based on both fairness and deterrence, why
common-law courts have rejected the but-for test as a rule for sufficient
cause cases. First, the judgment of the common law is that fairness
between the parties favors the plaintiffs recovery, for "it is quite clear

24. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 266-67
(5th ed. 1984). The term "substantial factor" is not wholly satisfactory, as it is used in
several ways in tort law and has no precise meaning. Id. at 267-68, 278. I share the view
that a better way to state the cause-in-fact rule of the two fires case is as follows:
When the conduct of two or more actors is so related to an event that their
combined conduct, viewed as a whole, is a but-for cause of the event, and
application of the but-for rule to them individually would absolve all of them, the
conduct of each is a cause in fact of the event.
Id. at 268. For convenience, I will call this a "sufficient cause" test. Note, however, that
philosophers draw subtle distinctions between versions of sufficient condition tests for
causation. See Tony Honor6, Necessary and Sufficient Conditions in Tort Law, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 363, 363-85 (David G. Owen ed., 1995). For
present purposes, it seems unnecessary to worry about these distinctions.
25. 429 U.S. at 287.
26. Id. at 285.
27. Id. at 286.
28. See, e.g., Whitaker v. Wallace, 170 F.3d 541, 544-45 (6th Cir. 1999); Heil v. Santoro,
147 F.3d 103, 110 (2d Cir. 1998); Harris v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 99 F.3d 1078, 1086
(11th Cir. 1996).
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that each cause has in fact played so important a part in producing the
result that responsibility should be imposed upon it." 29 There is no
apparent reason to treat mixed motives any differently from other kinds
of causes. As for the deterrence theme in tort law, the need for legal
intervention is established by the fact that the defendant's fire was
sufficient to do the harm by itself and would have done so even if there
was no other fire. Similarly, showing that the impermissible motive is
sufficient to produce an adverse employment action satisfies the goal of
establishing a need for intervention. It is a mere coincidence that a
permissible reason is also present. That coincidence does not give us
any reason to doubt that the defendant's conduct produces socially
undesirable consequences or the need for courts to intervene.
Though fairness and deterrence favor a sufficient cause test over the
but-for test, it does not necessarily follow that the second prong of Mt.
Healthy should simply be abandoned in favor of broad liability based on
sufficient cause. Given the potential multiplicity of motives, it may be
unwise to grant recovery whenever an impermissible one is sufficient.
Fairness between the parties and deterrence of socially harmful activity
may be better served by imposing liability only when the bad motive is
the primary one. To this end the common law offers another alternative
that is worth considering. Mixed motives are a problem in the common
law of defamation, and the resolution of the issue there may provide
guidance for constitutional torts. The issue comes up when a defendant
asserts that defamatory comments are privileged because either the
speaker has a legitimate personal or professional interest in making the
comments or because the recipient has a legitimate interest in receiving
them. If such an interest is present, there is justification for making the
statements. Yet a given speaker may actually be motivated by a desire
to hurt the plaintiff, or the speaker may simply like to gossip. In that
event the justification for making the statement is much weaker. Rather
than protecting the statement whenever a legitimate interest is present
or instructing the jury to decide whether the statement would have been
made but for the bad motive, courts instruct the jury to determine which
was the dominant purpose. 3°

29. KEETON ET AL., supra note 24, § 41, at 267; see also Honord, supra note 23, at 364
(favoring liability in such cases on the ground that causal analysis supports an exception
to the but-for test); Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact,9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 8894 (1956) (favoring liability in such cases on the ground that tort policy supports an
exception to the but-for test).
30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 603 cmt. a (1977). For an example, see
Schafroth v. Baker, 553 P.2d 1046, 1049-50 (Or. 1976).
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Adopting the dominant purpose test would probably favor the plaintiff
less than the sufficient cause test, but it would not take us back to Mt.
Healthy. The difference between the dominant purpose test and the butfor test is that the but-for test asks a rather different question. Instead
of directing the jury to determine which motive is most important, the
but-for test tells it to ask only whether the permissible one was
sufficient. Because a motive may be sufficient without being primary,
the but-for test will more often foreclose recovery. At the same time, the
dominant purpose test would not allow a plaintiff to recover whenever
the impermissible motive is sufficient, because the permissible one may
be primary. Because the purpose of this Article is limited to finding
fault with Mt. Healthy, and not to defending any particular alternative,
it seems appropriate here, and in the ensuing parts of the Article, to
offer the sufficient cause and dominant purpose tests as possible
replacements for Mt. Healthy without choosing between them. Either
would be better than the current rule.

III.

CAUSATION IN CONSTITUTIONAL TORT LAW

These common-law departures from the but-for test do not, by
themselves, establish that Mt. Healthy is wrong. On the contrary, the
better practice is to avoid mechanical application of any common-law
rule to the constitutional tort context. Constitutional tort law serves a
distinctive role in our system of constitutional remedies, and this
distinctive role may call for special rules on causation and other
matters."' Drawing analogies to ordinary tort law is an effective way
to cast doubt on the Mt. Healthy rule, as they show the divergence
between the Court's superficial treatment of the causation problem in
mixed-motive cases and the accumulated wisdom of the common law.
Such analogies can never be decisive because the aims of constitutional
tort law and the common law of torts diverge in important ways. Far
from supporting the Court's decision, these differences furnish powerful
arguments against Mt. Healthy. One distinction between constitutional
torts and common-law torts, discussed in this part of the Article,
concerns the distinctive role of constitutional tort law in our system of
constitutional remedies. Another distinction, addressed in Part IV,
relates to the special features of suits by public employees claiming
retaliation for protected speech.
Assuming that the but-for test is appropriate for mixed-motive
problems in ordinary tort law, two special features of constitutional tort

31. See Michael Wells, ConstitutionalRemedies, Section 1983 and the Common Law,
68 MIss. L.J. 157, 159-60 (1998).
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law call for replacing the Mt. Healthy rule with a sufficient cause or
dominate purpose test in section 1983 litigation.32 One of these is the
simple fact that constitutional tort law and the common law of torts
protect different interests. The common law of torts concerns the
allocation of responsibility for physical, emotional, or other personal
harm. In constitutional tort law, the rights at stake are fundamental
liberties. Perhaps the but-for test provides adequate protection for the
plaintiff's interests in compensation for personal injury and property
damage. It does not necessarily follow that the same judgment should
be made when constitutional rights are at issue. The point is not that
the plaintiff should be spared from any obligation to show a causal
connection just because he is asserting a constitutional claim. Rather,
the fact that constitutional tort law focuses on a narrow set of fundamental rights bears on the choice of a causation rule from among the
plausible candidates. The sufficient cause rule assures that the
defendant will be treated fairly. Only when the defendant's constitutionally impermissible reason is sufficient to bring about the harm will he
be held liable. The dominant purpose rule goes further in protecting
defendants by requiring that the impermissible motive be the primary
one. At the same time, these rules better protect constitutional rights
than the but-for test, as they permit recovery in cases in which there are
two sufficient motives, whereas the but-for test does not.
The other noteworthy difference between constitutional tort law and
the common law of torts concerns the aims behind imposing liability. In
both areas the aims include not only vindicating the plaintiff's rights,
but also deterring wrongful conduct. The former focuses on the merits
of the plaintiff's claim, whereas the latter is concerned with the systemic
impact of liability rules. But there is, or should be, a difference in the
emphasis placed on each of these aims as one moves from the common
law of torts to constitutional tort law. While systemic considerations
play a role in the common law, the focus of the litigation is usually on
the rights and duties of the parties toward one another. When systemic
considerations are paramount, an appropriate solution is to replace the
common law with a statutory scheme, as was done with workers'
compensation.3 3

32. See Eaton, supra note 2, at 454-55 ("Holding the wrongdoer responsible in such
situations provides greater deterrence of future misconduct, vindicates the plaintiffs rights,
and compensates the plaintiff for the injuries."); cf. Wells, supra note 31, at 205-10 (arguing
that constitutional values justify departing from common-law cause-in-fact rules).
33. See Richard A. Epstein, The HistoricalOriginsand Economic Structureof Workers'
Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775 (1982). For a recent argument that an effective
response to the problem of mass torts may require replacing tort principles with an
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As with the common law, one aim of constitutional tort law is to
compensate victims for injuries attributable to constitutional violations.34 An equally if not more important goal is to use private
lawsuits under section 1983 as a means to deter constitutional violations
that cannot be inhibited in any other way.35 Suits for damages may be
the only realistic means of dissuading government officials from violating
the First Amendment rights of public employees. Sometimes constitutional rights can be asserted defensively, as a shield to civil or criminal
liability, and in some situations one can bring a suit for prospective
relief to stop a present or threatened constitutional violation. In other
circumstances, however, constitutional wrongs can only be deterred
through suits for damages for past violations. Retaliation is a good
example.36
Because governments fire employees without using the judicial
process, there is no opportunity to raise one's rights defensively.
Prospective relief is rarely available because of the fact-sensitive nature
of the legal standard governing retaliation claims 7 and the Court's
willingness to allow employers to make ad hoc decisions. 3' As a
practical matter, the employee generally must bring a tort suit after the
fact to obtain relief.
For these reasons constitutional tort law should be conceived of as a
part of what Professor Abram Chayes has called "public law litigation."39 By this term Professor Chayes means to identify forms of
adjudication that use the lawsuit as a vehicle for "'the vindication of

administrative mechanism, see Richard A. Nagareda, In the Aftermath of the Mass Tort
Class Action, 85 GEO. L.J. 295 (1996).
34. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253-54 (1978); see also Memphis Community
Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306, 310 (1986) (applying the compensation principle
in the First Amendment context).
35. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1736 (1991) (characterizing "a general
structure of constitutional remedies adequate to keep government within the bounds of
law" as a "more absolute principle" of the law of constitutional remedies than the "strong
but not always unyielding" aim of "effective redress to individual victims of constitutional
violations"); see also id. at 1778-79; Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Theodore Y. Blumoff, Reshaping
Section 1983's Asymmetry, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 825 (1992).
36. Another example is a suit against the police or prison officials for the use of
excessive force or deliberate indifference to an inmate's medical needs. See Michael Wells,
Constitutional Torts, Common Law Torts, and Due Process of Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
617, 627-36 (1997).
37. See, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 678-79 (1996);
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569 (1968).
38. See, e.g., United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 46768 (1995); Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994) (plurality opinion).
39. See Wells, supra note 31, at 190-96.
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constitutional ... policies'"4" rather than merely as a means of resolving the rights and duties of the parties in traditional "private law"
fashion.4 Mt. Healthy's but-for test, with its emphasis on avoiding "[a]
rule of causation... [that] could place an employee in a better position
as a result of the exercise of constitutionally protected conduct than he
would have occupied had he done nothing,"42 seems to reflect a strictly
private law view, as do many other aspects of the contemporary Supreme
Court's section 1983 doctrine.43 Instead, we should conceive of damage
suits as a useful tool in the repertoire of remedies aimed at deterring
constitutional violations," and as an essential tool in the retaliation
context.
My point is not that all liability rules should favor the plaintiff. On
the contrary, the public law dimension of constitutional tort law
sometimes requires narrower liability. For example, the aim of the
official immunity doctrine, which denies the plaintiff compensatory
damages unless the defendant official is at fault,45 is to minimize the
danger that government officials will act too cautiously because of fear
of lawsuits.4" Accordingly, immunity is not available to private actors
sued under section 1983. 4 7 John Jeffries has recently argued that
limits on the recovery of damages from officials serves a broader social
goal: "[Tihe curtailment of damages liability for constitutional violations
has deep structural advantages for American constitutionalism ....
[T]he right-remedy gap in constitutional torts facilitates constitutional
change by reducing the costs of innovation ....
More importantly, the
fault-based regime for damages liability biases constitutional remedies

40. Id. at 193 (quoting Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1284 (1976)).
41. Chayes, supra note 40, at 1282-83. I do not mean to suggest that public law
solutions are never appropriate for physical harms. On the contrary, they may be
essential. See Nagareda, supra note 33, at 351-68; Rosenberg, supra note 23, at 859-60.
42. 429 U.S. at 285.
43. See Wells, supra note 31, at 190-93.
44. For a general introduction to this way of looking at constitutional remedies, see
Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials:
Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247 (1988).
45. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,814-18 (1982); see also John C. Jeffries, Jr.,
In Praiseof the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REV. 47, 54-59 (1998)
(discussing "the centrality of fault in the law of constitutional torts").
46. See PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL
WRONGS 59-81 (1983).
47. See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 402-04 (1997); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S.
158, 168-69 (1992). Private actors may, however, be entitled to a "good faith" defense. See
Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 169; Wyatt v. Cole, 994 F.2d 1113, 1118 (5th Cir. 1993).
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in favor of the future."4" In this way constitutional reform is facilitated
in that it can be realized without the added burden of obliging governments to pay reparations for what are now considered to be past wrongs.
Having adopted public law premises in the immunity context, the
Court's basic obligation to strive for coherence in the law comes into
play. 49 If the Court cannot explain why public law premises are
appropriate for one issue but not others, it ought to employ the public
law model in resolving other constitutional tort issues as well.5 ° Once
the plaintiff has overcome the fault hurdle, the case for further special
restrictions on liability is weak, and the deterrence aim should be
paramount.
Quite apart from the equities between plaintiff and
defendant, the causation rules should reflect this deterrent aim. The
plaintiff should prevail when the impermissible motive is dominant and
perhaps whenever it is sufficient.
The foregoing discussion has stressed the purposes of vindication and
deterrence, paying no attention to precedent. In this context the
emphasis on policy analysis is justified because there were no directly
applicable precedents on either side of the causation issue raised in Mt.
Healthy. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Mt. Healthy,
cited three decisions, Lyons v. Oklahoma,5 Wong Sun v. United
States,52 and Parker v. North Carolina,5 in which the issue was
whether the government in a criminal prosecution may, after obtaining
an illegal arrest or confession from a criminal defendant, use a later
confession or guilty plea to convict him.54 These cases stand for the
principle that the later event may stand on its own so long as the
connection between it and the unconstitutional event is sufficiently
attenuated. 5 In Lyons, Wong Sun, and Parker, the Court reasoned
that the passage of time and changes in circumstances between the
unconstitutional event and the valid one provide assurance that the later
event is not tainted by the former one.5" This principle of criminal

48. John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in ConstitutionalLaw, 109 YALE L.J.
87, 90 (1999).
49. See RONALD DWORIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 95-96 (1986) (using the term "law as
integrity" to describe this constraint on judges).
50. See Wells, supra note 31, at 195-96 (noting the inconsistency between the public law
premises employed in immunity law and the private law premises underlying the causation
and damages doctrines).
51. 322 U.S. 596 (1944).

52. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
53. 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
54. 429 U.S. at 286-87.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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procedure has little in common with the Mt. Healthy problem of mixed
motives operating at the same time. 7 The Court admitted that the
analogy between the criminal procedure and mixed motive contexts is a
strained one and declared that it used the analogy merely as an
illustration of a general policy served by the causation requirement.5 s
Thus, "the type of causation on which the taint cases turn may differ
somewhat from that which we apply here," yet "those cases do suggest
that the proper test to apply in the present context is one which likewise
protects against the invasion of constitutional rights without commanding undesirable consequences not necessary to the assurance of those
59
rights."
IV.

PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT,
AND SECTION

1983

The mixed-motives issue is especially prominent in First Amendment
retaliatory discharge cases. The First Amendment protects government
employees from adverse employment actions ° taken against them
because of protected speech, but it does not prohibit the government
from taking adverse action against someone who has coincidentally
engaged in protected speech. The typical fact pattern in retaliation
cases features a plaintiff who has engaged in speech protected by the
First Amendment but who has also acted in ways that are not shielded
by the Constitution. Alternatively, the plaintiff may have acted in
exemplary fashion, yet there could be staffing problems, resource
allocation issues, or other routine features of the workplace that could
justify dismissing, demoting, or otherwise disadvantaging the plaintiff.
Even after the plaintiff has established that the First Amendment
protects the speech, it must be determined whether the speech or some
other reason prompted the employer to fire the plaintiff. This is not
necessarily an either-or question, for the motivations for human behavior
are often complex. Officials in charge of personnel decisions, like other
human beings, do not typically segregate their thoughts into two

57. If there is a tort analogy to this rationale, it comes from the doctrine of proximate
cause. Under that banner, courts hold that a driver who impedes the plaintiffs progress
is not liable for an accident the plaintiff suffers hours later, though the plaintiff would not
have been at the location of the accident had he not been impeded by the defendant. See,
e.g., Marshall v. Nugent, 222 F.2d 604, 612 (1st Cir. 1955).
58. 429 U.S. at 287.
59. Id.
60. Adverse employment actions include not only dismissals but also demotions and
perhaps other kinds of ill treatment. See, e.g., Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S.
62, 73-76 (1990); Nunez v. City of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 867, 874-75 (9th Cir. 1998); Pierce
v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice, 37 F.3d 1146, 1149 (5th Cir. 1994).
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categories, allowing only one set of reasons to influence their choices.
The causation issue comes up in situations in which the public employer
has mixed motives, at least one of which is a permissible reason for
firing the plaintiff, and at least one of which is an impermissible one.
Whatever the merit of the Mt. Healthy rule in other constitutional
contexts, it is especially ill-suited to constitutional tort suits charging
retaliation for the exercise of First Amendment rights. To see why, it is
necessary to understand certain features of the substantive context in
which this kind of litigation takes place. The leading case in the area
is Pickering v. Board of Education,"'in which a school teacher had
been dismissed for criticizing the Board's policies on school finance in a
letter to the newspaper. 2 Upholding plaintiff's claim, the Court
"unequivocally rejected" the premise "that teachers may constitutionally
be compelled to relinquish the First Amendment rights they would
otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public interest in
connection with the operation of the public schools in which they
work." 3 However, public employees do not enjoy as much freedom to
speak as other citizens because "the State has interests as an employer
in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from
those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the
citizenry in general."' Pickering gave rise to a distinctive body of First
Amendment law relating to the rights of public employees. Fifteen years
after Pickering, in Connick v. Myers,65 the Court gave the doctrine its
current structure, setting out a two-part test.66 To prevail the plaintiff
must first establish that the speech related to a "matter of public
concern." 7 If this hurdle is met, the court must engage in "particularized balancing," weighing the benefits of the speech against its costs,
which are measured largely by its potential for disrupting the government workplace."
One general problem with this body of doctrine is that free speech is
a "delicate and vulnerable"6 9 right that needs special protection to
flourish. Though there are exceptions, the choice to engage in speech is
usually a highly discretionary one. Moreover, most speakers gain
nothing tangible by coming forward. Faced with a choice between

61.
62.
63.
64.

391 U.S. 563 (1968).
Id. at 564.
Id. at 568.
Id.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

461 U.S. 138 (1983).
Id. at 147-51.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 150-51.
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
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keeping silent and risking nothing, or speaking out and perhaps losing
a secure job, many of us would be likely to choose the latter course. In
some contexts the benefits of free speech go mainly to the speaker, and
the fact that speakers may be intimidated by the fear of some sanction
may not be troubling. However, the Pickering/ Connick doctrine assures
that the job-related speech for which public employees may recover
addresses a matter of public concern.7" Such speech is protected
because "[tihe public interest in having free and unhindered debate on
matters of public importance [is] the core value of the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment."71 Public employees should be encouraged to speak on matters of public concern because "[glovernment
employees are often in the best position to know what ails the agencies
for which they work; public debate may gain much from their informed
opinions."72
In theory the Pickering/Connick formulation of the public employee
speech doctrine achieves an appropriate balance between the value of
free speech and the special needs of the government workplace. In
practice, however, it may exacerbate the problem of fragility and
discourage valuable public employee speech. The problem is that both
parts of the test are fact sensitive. For example, the "public concern"
inquiry does not turn solely on the content of the speech. The speaker's
motive is a significant factor in determining whether speech is on a
matter of public concern. 73 Even if this test is met, Connick directs
courts to balance the value of the speech against its potential for
disruption on a case by case basis.74 One can rarely be sure ahead of
time whether a given instance of speech is protected or not. This
uncertainty, combined with the official immunity doctrine, poses a
further problem. Damages may not be obtained against the offending
supervisor unless the right was clearly established at the time the
adverse action was taken. 75 This test is difficult to meet in a legal
regime that emphasizes fact-sensitive inquiries under Pickering/Connick.7 s

70. 461 U.S. at 147; 391 U.S. at 573.
71. 391 U.S. at 573.
72. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994) (plurality opinion).
73. See, e.g., Connick, 461 U.S. at 148; Gonzalez v. Lee County Hous. Auth., 161 F.3d
1290, 1297 (lth Cir. 1998); O'Donnell v. Barry, 148 F.3d 1126, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
74. 461 U.S. at 147-48.
75. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Wells, supra note 31,
at 203 & n.210.
76. See, e.g., Moran v. Washington, 147 F.3d 839, 847 (9th Cir. 1998), and cases cited
therein.
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One way to make retaliation law a more effective tool for protecting
public employee speech is to reshape the substantive law by moving from
the current regime of flexible standards to a body of hard-edged rules."
However, it may be unrealistic to expect the Court to undertake such a
major reform. Moving from the but-for test of Mt. Healthy to a more
plaintiff-friendly causation rule, like the sufficient cause or dominant
purpose test, would ameliorate some of the problems plaintiffs face
because of other features of the substantive and remedial doctrine on
suing for damages.
The case for replacing Mt. Healthy is not solely a matter of making up
for other obstacles to recovery. The Mt. Healthy causation rule operates
in a social context in which officials often act with mixed motives. By
requiring that the but-for test be met, the rule invites government
employers in retaliation cases to make causation an issue, and many do
so." As a result, the employee who speaks always has to worry about
the possibility that the employer may have some other reason sufficient
to fire him, that the employer can convince a jury that there is such a
reason,79 or that the employer can convince a court to grant summary
judgment on this ground without giving the plaintiff a chance to reach
the jury.80 Employers in retaliation cases often find some evidence of
insubordinate behavior or can point to some other ground for the action
taken, and they have had a fair amount of success in showing that a
permissible motive, and not the protected speech, was the cause in fact

77. For an argument along these lines, see Michael Wells, Section 1983, the First
Amendment, and Public Employee Speech: Bridging the Gap Between Right and Remedy
1 (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
78. See, e.g., Graning v. Sherburne County, 172 F.3d 611, 615-16 (8th Cir. 1999);
Whitaker v. Wallace, 170 F.3d 541, 544-45 (6th Cir. 1999); Sales v. Grant, 158 F.3d 768,
776-79 (4th Cir. 1998); Gubitosi v. Kapica, 154 F.3d 30, 33 (2d Cir. 1998); Kelly v.
Municipal Courts, 97 F.3d 902, 908-09 (7th Cir. 1996); Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ.,
93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996).
79. Cf.Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful DischargeProtectionsin an At-Will World, 74 TEX.
L. REV. 1655, 1673 (1996) (discussing the causation hurdle in wrongful discharge law
generally).
80. See, e.g., Butler v. City of Prairie Village, 172 F.3d 736, 746-47 (10th Cir. 1999);
Benningfield v. City of Houston, 157 F.3d 369, 377 (5th Cir. 1998); Heil v. Santoro, 147
F.3d 103, 110 (2d Cir. 1998); Gattis v. Brice, 136 F.3d 724, 726-27 (lth Cir. 1998);
Vazquez v. Lopez-Rosario, 134 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 1998); Berg v. Bruce, 112 F.3d 322, 329
(8th Cir. 1997); Bailey v. Floyd County Bd. of Educ., 106 F.3d 135, 144-45 (6th Cir. 1997);
Hanton v. Gilbert, 36 F.3d 4, 7 (4th Cir. 1994); cf. Fultz v. Dunn, 165 F.3d 215, 221 (3d Cir.
1998) (reversing the district court's denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law);
Pierce v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice, 37 F.3d 1146, 1150-51 (5th Cir. 1994) (affirming
the district court's grant of a motion for judgment as a matter of law).
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of the dismissal.8 ' Large governmental organizations have a special
advantage, for defendants often prevail in cases in which the official who
disciplined the plaintiff is someone other than the official who had an
impermissible motive.82
V.

CONCLUSION

There is a wide disparity between the importance of the rule
announced in Mt. Healthy and the attention the issue received in the
Court's opinion. Retaliation cases make up a significant part of the
business of the federal courts, and a key issue in a large proportion of
retaliation cases is identifying the motive for the adverse employment
action. Despite the importance of causation, Mt. Healthy addresses the
issue in just three pages at the end of an opinion devoted mainly to
other matters." No doubt three pages would be sufficient, if they were
used wisely. However, the Court in Mt. Healthy offered only fragments
of arguments rather than cogent reasoning. The result is an unconvincing hodgepodge that leaves unanswered the difficult questions raised by
the causation issue.
Adopting a more plaintiff-friendly causation rule would not be costless.
Governments would be less free than they are now to fire incompetent,
lazy, disruptive, or unneeded workers. But the costs are not nearly as
great as the Court in Mt. Healthy made them out to be. The Court
defended its rule as a way to avoid the undesirable consequences of
allowing plaintiffs to win whenever the employer "considered constitutionally protected conduct,"" or whenever "a dramatic and perhaps
abrasive incident is inevitably on the minds of those responsible for the
decision" 5 -in
other words, whenever an impermissible motive
influenced the employer's decision. The Court was understandably
concerned that public employers would be hamstrung in their efforts to
rid themselves of unproductive or disruptive workers if it adopted a lax
causation rule. 6 Given the breadth of speech covered by the First

81. See cases cited supra notes 78 & 80; Brady v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d
1419, 1424-25 (5th Cir. 1997); Harris v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 99 F.3d 1078, 1085
(11th Cir. 1996).
82. See, e.g., Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 745 (11th Cir. 1996);
Pierce v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice, 37 F.3d 1146, 1150 (5th Cir. 1994).
83. See 429 U.S. at 285-87. The other parts of the opinion deal with the school board's
argument that section 1983 did not cover its actions, see id. at 277-79, its Eleventh
Amendment argument, see id. at 279-81, and the substantive free speech issue, see id. at
281-84.
84. Id. at 286.
85. Id. at 285.
86. See id.
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Amendment, virtually any clever employee could come up with a
plausible argument that protected speech influenced the supervisor who
fired him.
While the concern is real, its force depends on the target at which it
is aimed. It is a persuasive reason against allowing recovery whenever
an impermissible motive had any bearing on the decision. As applied to
the alternatives proposed in this Article, however, the argument attacks
a straw man. Neither the sufficient cause test nor the dominant purpose
test would allow the plaintiff to prevail in such a broad category of cases.
Under the sufficient cause test, the jury would be instructed to find for
the plaintiff only when the impermissible motive would have been
sufficient to produce the adverse employment action, and not whenever
an impermissible motive figured in the decision. The dominant purpose
test is at least equally demanding because it directs the jury to
determine whether the impermissible motive was the primary reason for
the action taken.
Whatever value the arguments advanced in this article may have, the
evolution of the law over the past two decades provides another reason
why Mt. Healthy needs to be reconsidered. The Court in 1977 may not
have forecast the growth of section 1983 litigation in the ensuing
decades. A number of developments in constitutional tort law during
this period have reshaped the context in which the Court decided Mt.
Healthy. For example, the Court adopted an objective approach to
qualified immunity after it decided Mt. Healthy. 7 Other developments
in constitutional tort law in the years since Mt. Healthy also have
altered the context in which the Court concluded that the but-for test
sufficiently vindicates constitutional values. For example, the Court in
Memphis Community School District v. Stachura81 forbade recovery for
the abstract value of First Amendment rights and held that plaintiffs
must prove actual harm to prevail.8" In addition, the Court in Monell
v. Department of Social Services9' held that local governments may be
liable if the constitutional violation is produced by an official policy or

87. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19 (1982). At the time the Court
decided Mt. Healthy, a plaintiff could win by showing that the officer acted in bad faith,
whatever the state of the law at the time. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 31322 (1975). After Harlow, the official's motivation is irrelevant. See Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987).
88. 477 U.S. 299 (1986).
89. Id. at 305-10.
90. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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custom, 91 thereby giving rise to a body of law, some of which bears on
retaliation law,92 that struggles to define those terms. 3
None of these developments are incompatible with the causation rule
announced in Mt. Healthy. However, rulings about one dimension of law
ought to reflect the whole array of principles related to the issue at
hand. As law evolves and the context changes over time, it is good
practice to reconsider established rules on related topics. For example,
the new immunity rule took away the plaintiff's opportunity to divest the
defendant of immunity by showing an impermissible motive, thereby
making it more difficult for a plaintiff to prevail in virtually any
constitutional tort case brought against an official. Whether Mt.
Healthy's but-for test sufficiently vindicates the free speech value at
stake in the case, as the Court thought it did at the time, ought to be
reconsidered in light of the new immunity rule and other developments
in constitutional tort doctrine that have occurred over the past two
decades.

91. Id. at 690-91.
92. See, e.g., City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 126-28 (1988).
93. For another important post-Mt. Healthy ruling, see Cleveland Board of Education
v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
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